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PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
RESPONSIBILITY: LEAVING ROOM FOR THE 
HOMELESS. 
 
Sarah E. Hamill  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the recent case of Victoria (City) v Adams to examine how 
Canadian law guarantees or restricts access to publicly accessible property. The paper 
argues that the understanding and view of property in Adams is in keeping with the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on publicly accessible property. By 
comparing public property with private property, the paper argues that in Canada all 
property is seen as private property and is protected as such. The paper argues that 
the current understanding of property is unacceptable because it leaves no room for 
those who have no private property rights. It looks at other models of property to see 
if they leave room for those with no property of their own. The paper then moves on 
to argue that the common law, despite understanding all property as private, leaves 
room for those who have no property of their own. This feature of the common law 
of property has often been overlooked, however, resulting in laws that are 
unworkable and unacceptable. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent case of Victoria (City) v Adams1 reveals some implicit ideas about 
property and property rights in Canada. The City of Victoria argued that the homeless 
people’s claim was really about property rights because they were attempting to have 
public property allocated to their exclusive use. The British Columbia Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal rejected this claim.2 However, a careful reading of the case 
and analysis of the way the Courts deal with the claims of the homeless reveal an 
understanding of what property is and what property owners can and cannot do, 
                                                 
 LL.B Hons. (University of Glasgow), LL.M. (University of Toronto), Ph.D. Candidate 
(University of Alberta). I would like to thank Bruce Ziff, Daniela Sanhueza and the two 
anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.  All 
mistakes are mine. 
1
 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams (BCCA) cited to DLR]. 
2
  Victoria (City) v Adams, 2008 BCSC 1363, 299 DLR (4th) 193 at para 132 [Adams (BCSC) 
cited to DLR]; Adams (BCCA), ibid at para 100. 
 2 
 
especially when the property owner is a public body.3 When the Courts examine 
whether or not the homeless of Victoria are claiming a property right, they reveal an 
assumption that private property is the dominant, if not the only, model.  Adams also 
sheds light on a more troubling issue surrounding the way that property controls 
where a person can be at any given time and what they can do while there.4 
At first glance however, the case does not seem to be about property at all. The 
case centred on the City of Victoria’s by-laws which prohibited homeless people 
from erecting overhead protection while they slept in public parks.  The by-laws did 
not prohibit sleeping in the parks but forbade any structures “although a simple, 
individual, non-structural, weather repellent cover...that is removed once a person is 
awake is allowed.”5  Both the BC Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal found that 
the by-laws violated section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 Section 7 of 
the Charter deals with the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and makes 
no mention of property. 
This paper begins with an examination of what the decisions of the courts in 
Adams reveal about judicial understanding of property.  It will then explore how the 
Supreme Court of Canada understands publicly accessible property through an 
examination of some key decisions about access to property and property rights. 
Having briefly outlined how the Supreme Court of Canada understands property, and 
who is entitled to access what property, the paper will move on to examine other 
models of property. The paper will argue that these different models are by 
themselves no more likely to grant room for the homeless than the model that exists 
in Canada.  However, a combination of models or concepts of property can provide 
room for the homeless within the private property model.  The paper will conclude by 
arguing that even though the common law understands all property as private, it does 
leave room for those who have no property although this has often been overlooked.  
The predicament of the homeless, namely that they have no private property 
rights of their own, forces them to live entirely on publicly accessible property, or on 
those private properties, such as shelters, which are open to them.  The term publicly 
accessible property is used here because it is not clear if public property exists as a 
separate legal category in Canada.7   
                                                 
3
 Unless otherwise stated, throughout this essay I will use property to refer to property in land. 
4
 Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom” (1991-1992) 39 UCLA L Rev 
295 at 296 [Waldron, “Homelessness”]. 
5
 Adams (BCSC), supra note 2 at para 26.  
6
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11 [Charter]; Adams (BCCA), supra  note 1 
at para 195; Adams (BCSC), ibid at para 239. 
7
 In fact, it is not clear that public property exists as a separate category in any common law 
country.  As early as the 1920s, Morris Cohen pointed out those who make the decisions 
about property law in common law countries tend to have trained more in private law than 
public law which has not helped theorize the public or social aspects of property, see 
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The existing theories of property often overlook the predicament of the 
homeless.  Jane B. Baron called for ‘no property’ to become a recognised legal 
category but while she introduced this idea, she has yet to develop it further to 
explain how it might fit into the current legal understanding of property.8 C.B. 
Macpherson proposed the concept of the “right… not to be excluded” from certain 
kinds of property.9 This paper will use his ideas to further develop Baron’s ‘no 
property’ category, evaluate the existing model of property in Canada, and 
demonstrate that the common law of property does have room for the property-less. It 
will be argued that the current understanding of property in Canada does not 
recognize those with no private property and will suggest a way this could be 
changed. 
The understanding of property found in Adams is in keeping with the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. However, most of the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence centres on the right to freedom of expression on publicly accessible 
property (i.e. Harrison v Carswell 10 and Committee for the Commonwealth of 
Canada v Canada11). The jurisprudence does not deal with the issue of those who 
lack any private property rights of their own.12  It was this lack of private property 
that made the homeless population’s claim in Adams about the right to exist rather 
than the right to property.13   The homeless in Adams did not claim that they had a 
private property right in the park where they slept, but that they had a right to 
construct adequate shelter so that they could keep themselves alive. 
                                                                                                                               
“Property and Sovereignty,” in CB Macpherson, ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical 
Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 155 at 168. 
8
 Jane B Baron, “Homelessness as a Property Problem” (2004) 36 Urban Lawyer 273 [Baron, 
“Homelessness”]; Jane B Baron, “The “No Property” Problem: Understanding Poverty by 
Understanding Wealth” (2004) 102 Mich L Rev1000 [Baron, “No Property”]; Jane B. Baron, 
“Property and “No Property” (2006) 42 Houston L Rev 1425 [Baron, “Property”]. 
9
 CB Macpherson, “The Meaning of Property,” in CB Macpherson, ed, Property: Mainstream 
and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 1 at 4 [Macpherson, 
“Meaning of Property”]. 
10
 [1976] 2 SCR 200, 62 DLR (3d) 68  [Harrison cited to SCR]. 
11
 [1991] 1 SCR139, 77 DLR (4th) 385 [Commonwealth of Canada cited to SCR]. 
12
 Jeremy Waldron, “Community and Property – For Those Who Have Neither” (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 161 at 171 [Waldron, “Community and Property”]; Nicholas 
Blomley, “Homelessness, Rights, and the Delusions of Property” (2009) 30:6 Urban 
Geography 577 at 581 [Blomley, “Homelessness”]; Baron, “Homelessness”, supra  note 8 at 
273, 288. 
13
 In the case of Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429,221 
DLR (4th) 257 [Gosselin cited to SCR]. Gosselin argued that the Government of Quebec had 
deprived her of social assistance in such a way that infringed her section 7 rights.  As the 
Charter does not provide explicit protection to property rights, Gosselin could not claim that 
she had a property right in social assistance, which, as with Adams, meant she resorted to a 
section 7 claim.  It is outside the scope of this paper, however, to examine whether or not 
property rights exist in social welfare programs. 
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VICTORIA (CITY) V ADAMS: WHERE AND WHEN YOU CAN AND 
CANNOT BE 
 
In the judgments of the trial and appellate courts in Adams, it was suggested that 
had certain facts in the case been different, it would likely have significantly altered 
the decisions.14  To understand such comments, it is necessary to provide some 
background to the Adams litigation. 
At the time of the litigation, the City of Victoria had a significant homeless 
population but it did not have enough shelter beds for all the homeless to have 
somewhere to sleep at night.15  Consequently a number of homeless people slept in 
public parks, which the City tolerated so long as those sleeping in parks did not erect 
any structures to shelter themselves.16  However, in 2005 some homeless people 
established a tent city in Victoria’s Cridge Park.  The City sought to have the tent city 
removed on the grounds that it violated municipal by-laws.17  By the time the issue 
came to trial, those who had been living in the tent city had vacated Cridge Park, and 
had filed a counter-claim arguing that the by-laws violated the Charter.18 Thus, the 
issue at the BC Supreme Court was the constitutionality of the by-laws as a whole, 
and not the correctness of the by-laws’ application to the tent city. 
Arguably, had the tent city still been in existence, the outcome of the trial would 
have been very different.  The Attorney General of British Columbia argued that the 
tent city went beyond the ‘mere “shelter”’ that the homeless were claiming a right to; 
however, Ross J pointed out that the issue was not the tent city but the 
constitutionality of the by-laws.19  She also stated that the homeless were not 
“seeking...the right to establish permanent tent cities in the public parks.”20  Had they 
been seeking this right, they would have lost because a permanent tent city would 
have been “an appropriation of public property for private use.”21 
This provides an insight into what the BC Supreme Court understood the rights 
of access and use of public property to mean.  Ross J emphasized the temporary 
nature of the shelter that people who sleep in public parks would be likely to erect 
and further declared the by-laws of no force and effect only insofar as they applied to 
                                                 
14
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at paras 127-128 and 191; Adams (BCCA), supra  note 1 para 
74. 
15
 Adams (BCSC), ibid at paras 38-58. 
16
 Ibid at para 26; City of Victoria, by-law No 07-057, Parks Regulation Bylaw, ss13(1)(a), 
14(1)(d). 
17
 Adams (BCSC), ibid at paras 7-11. 
18
 Ibid at paras 12, 28. 
19
 Ibid at paras 70-73, 127. 
20
 Ibid.at para 213. 
21
 Ibid at para 126. 
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temporary structures.22   The frequent reference to the non-permanent nature of the 
shelter is important, because it makes the claim of the homeless equivalent to that of 
other citizens who also use the park.  For example, a family having a picnic in a 
public park might spread a blanket on the ground.  Such an action creates a 
temporary interest in public property, and one that is likely to be respected by other 
patrons of the park.23   
While reference to the temporary nature of the sleeping shelters is essential to 
the success of the homeless people’s claim, it does ignore the fact that the homeless 
differ from other citizens in one key way: they have no private property of their own.  
The understanding that citizens only want temporary access to public property 
assumes that they have private property of their own to retreat to.  For the vast 
majority of people, this assumption of a private property interest is correct.24  The 
homeless are, by contrast, excluded from all private property unless they secure the 
owner’s permission to be there.25  Thus, they must spend their lives on publicly 
accessible property, but it is assumed that a person only wants or needs temporary 
access to such property.  The homeless, therefore, are permanently on property to 
which they only have a temporary right to access and use.26  The City of Victoria 
even stated that its by-laws aimed at avoiding permanence in an individual’s use of 
the park.27  If the regulations which spell out the temporary nature of the right to 
access and use public places are strictly enforced, the homeless must constantly move 
to avoid running afoul of them.28   
The Courts also viewed sleeping in public parks to be temporary in another way.  
Property law governs where a person has a right to be at any given time and what 
they can do there.29 The BC Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal thought that 
shelters were the proper place for homeless people to be at night.  Ross J points out 
that if there were enough shelter spaces “the case would be different and more 
                                                 
22
 Ibid at para 237. 
23
 Robert C Ellickson, “Property in Land” (1992-1993) 102 Yale LJ 1315 at 1364; Ellickson’s 
argument has some echoes with the informal rules which surfers use to informally govern 
access to the “surfing commons"; Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the 
Politics of Property (New York: Routledge, 2004) at 18 [Blomley, Unsettling the City]. 
24
 I say interest because citizens might rent rather than own. 
25
 Waldron, “Homelessness”, supra  note 4 at 299. 
26Due to the temporary nature of this right the homeless struggle to meet their most basic 
needs, see ibid at 311-312, 323. 
27
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at paras 206-207.  
28
 Such regulations have been frequently been the subject of litigation in the United States of 
America. By way of example, see Jones v City of Los Angeles, 444 F3d 1118, (2006); Lehr v 
City of Sacramento 624 FSupp 2d 1218, ED Cal2009; Pottinger v City of Miami 810 F 
Supp1551, SD Fla, 1992. For another Canadian example, see R v Banks, 2007 ONCA 19, 84 
OR (3d)1, 275 DLR (4th) 640 [Banks cited to OR]. This case does not deal with homelessness 
per se but it does deal with legislation regulating begging. 
29
 Waldron, “Homelessness”, supra  note 4 at 302. 
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difficult.”30  The Court of Appeal goes further and says that “[i]f there were sufficient 
shelter spaces to accommodate the homeless population in Victoria, a blanket 
prohibition on the erection of overhead protection in public parks might be 
constitutional.”31   
The remedy that the Court of Appeal granted reflects the view that the proper 
place for the homeless is in shelters.  The Court of Appeal found that the by-laws 
“are inoperative insofar and only insofar as they apply to prevent homeless people 
from erecting temporary overnight shelter in parks when the number of homeless 
people exceeds the number of available shelter beds…”32  The remedy that the BC 
Supreme Court granted made no mention of the time period when the invalidity 
would operate, nor did Ross J limit the suspension until such a time when there might 
be enough shelter beds.33 Thus the Court of Appeal reveals an implicit understanding 
that the proper place for the homeless at night is in shelters and denies the homeless 
the right to provide their own shelter. 
The reason why the right of access to and use of publicly accessible property is 
only temporary is because a permanent right would be exclusionary, and thus it 
would turn public property into private.  If you can exclude someone from property 
under your control and the true owner of the property does not interrupt your 
occupation, then under the doctrine of adverse possession you can become the legal 
owner of the property.34 Alberta is the only province in Canada to exclude Crown 
land from being subject to adverse possession.35 However, British Columbia has 
introduced some limits to adverse possession and has abolished the acquisition of 
property rights through prescription.36  Thus the homeless could claim no adverse 
possession rights over public parks.   
                                                 
30
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 191. 
31
 Adams (BCCA), supra  note 1 at para 74. 
32
 Ibid at para 166. 
33
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 239. 
34
 See e.g. Teis v Ancaster (Town), [1997] 35 OR (3d) 216, 152 DLR (4th) 304 (Ont CA) [Teis 
cited to OR].  
35
 For Alberta, see Public Lands Act, RSA 2000, c P-40, s 4; Limitations Act, RSA 2000 c L-
12, s 2(4)(a).  In Ontario, the time period for adverse possession on Crown land is sixty years 
instead of ten years for privately owned land, see Real Property Limitations Act, RSO 1990 c 
L-15, s 3. 
36
 Land Title Act, RSBC 1996, c C-250, ss 23-24. Even if prescription still existed in British 
Columbia, it is unlikely that the homeless could have claimed they had a prescriptive 
easement over public parks, as prescription requires years of use. In addition, an easement 
typically relates to two parcels of land: one being the dominant tenement and the other as 
servient tenement.  The homeless have no land and they could not claim an easement over 
public property.  An easement would only give the homeless a right to use property for a 
specific purpose. For a further discussion on prescriptive easements, see Report on the Basic 
Principles of Land Law (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1997) at 133-138. 
Likewise, any claim of adverse possession would have failed due to the short length of time 
that the tent city had existed.  
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In their examination of whether or not the homeless of Victoria were claiming a 
property right, the Courts reveal an understanding of property which assumes private 
property to be the dominant model.  Neither Court differentiates explicitly between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ property in the context of the allegation that the homeless were 
claiming a property right.  Admittedly, property rights are not protected under the 
Charter and this would presumably apply to public property rights, if there are such 
things in Canada.  Nevertheless, the Courts implicitly assume that any property right 
would be one that would fit into the private property model.  In understanding 
property rights this way, the judgments highlight that the essence of the private 
property model is the inter-related rights of exclusion and control. 
The City of Victoria claimed that the homeless were asserting a right to camp on 
public property and thus they were claiming a property right.37 The City’s argument 
did not convince Ross J, who pointed out that because there are not enough shelter 
spaces “[t]he use of some public property by the homeless is unavoidable.”38 Ross J 
did not think that the homeless were appropriating public property, because the 
homeless were not trying to exclude anyone else from using the parks.39  In fact in 
Ross J’s view, a homeless person sleeping in the park at night would not prevent 
other members of the public from using the park during the day.40 The regulation of 
public spaces requires a careful balancing act, because public spaces are for everyone 
– no person’s use should preclude another from enjoying them.41 The BC Supreme 
Court seems to differentiate between the rights of access to and use of public and 
private property based on the permanence and exclusivity of the rights to private 
property. By pointing out that the homeless people’s presence on public property is 
only temporary, Ross J shows how their demands are not for a private property right, 
but for a more appropriate balancing in the regulation of public space.   
The BC Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s finding that the homeless 
were not claiming a property right:  
 
The right asserted by the respondents and recognized by the trial 
judge is the right to provide oneself with rudimentary shelter on a 
temporary basis in areas where the City acknowledges that people 
can, and must, sleep.  This is not a property right, but a right to be 
free of a state-imposed prohibition on the activity of creating or 
utilizing shelter, a prohibition which was found to impose significant 
and potentially severe health risks on one of the City’s most 
vulnerable and marginalized populations.42 
                                                 
37
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 126. 
38
 Ibid at para 129. 
39
 Ibidat para 132. 
40
 Ibid at paras 130, 181. 
41
 Waldron, “Homelessness”, supra  note 4 at 312. 
42
 Adams (BCCA), supra  note 1 at para 100 [emphasis added]. 
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Similar to the trial Court, the Court of Appeal differentiates a property right from the 
private property model.  The Court of Appeal seems to think that any property right 
to the park would be permanent in nature, and because of this it would exclude others 
from the park.  Thus, a property right can change the nature of the land from public to 
private.   
Through an examination of what the Courts say about property rights, we can 
see that they understand that private property centres on the right to exclude.  The 
right to exclude is related to the right to control who can access your property and 
what they can do while there.   In the context of the right to control property, both 
Courts focus on the actions of the City of Victoria.  It is here that a potentially 
different model of property comes to light.  The BC Supreme Court refers to an 
earlier Supreme Court of Canada case, Commonwealth of Canada ,43 to reject the idea 
that “the government can determine the use of its property in the same manner as a 
private owner.”44  However, Ross J does not argue that public property is an entirely 
different category from private property. 
The government may not be the same as a private owner but it is an owner 
nonetheless.  According to Ross J, “[p]ublic properties are held for the benefit of the 
public, which includes the homeless.”45 The question is whether the kind of 
ownership a government has is so different from a private citizen that government 
owned property becomes another class of property altogether. Judging by the 
evidence presented in Adams, government ownership does not drastically alter the 
nature and rights of property ownership, and therefore public property is not a 
separate class of private property. 
In the decision of the BC Supreme Court, Ross J was convinced that the 
homeless were not demanding a property right, because all they were asking was that 
the City not manage its property in a way that “interferes with their ability to keep 
themselves safe and warm.”46 As a public body, the City of Victoria must respect the 
Charter, and this is arguably the main difference between government owned and 
privately owned property.  A private individual could manage his or her property in a 
way that would prohibit the homeless from entering, whereas the City of Victoria 
must manage its property in compliance with the Charter.  So if Victoria wishes to 
ban the homeless from its property, it must show that any infringement of the Charter 
flowing from the prohibition is allowed under section 1. 
                                                 
43
 Supra  note 11. This case was about the freedom of expression. It arose when members of an 
interest group attempted to distribute leaflets at Montreal’s Dorval airport. The airport 
managers and security personnel told the group that they could not distribute leaflets at the 
airport, and the group claimed that this restriction breached their freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the Charter. 
44
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 131.   
45
 Ibid. 
46
 See ibid at paras 132, 188. 
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Both the BC Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal found that while the by-
laws were aimed at achieving an important objective, they did not comply with the 
Charter.47  If the requirement that government property is managed in compliance 
with the Charter is the only way it is differentiated from a private citizen’s property, 
it does not seem as though publicly owned property is inherently different from 
private property.  In the case of government owned and publicly accessible property48 
the Charter acts as a limitation on how the owner can manage its property.  The 
property of private citizens is also subject to limitations, for example the law of 
nuisance restricts what a private owner can do on his or her property.49  At best, the 
Charter limitations on government property create a type of property which could be 
described as ‘private property minus’ rather than a category of public property which 
is different ab initio. 
The following section will now look at some Canadian Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to show that the property law aspects of Adams are in keeping with 
how public property is understood by Canada’s highest court. 
 
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has long recognised that government owned 
property is not the same as property owned by private citizens.  For example in the 
1932 case of Vancouver (City) v Burchill,50 Rinfret J said “municipalities are in a 
sense owners of the streets.  They are not, however, owners in the full sense of the 
word, and certainly not to the extent that a proprietor owns his land.”51 Much like 
Ross J, Rinfret J argued that municipalities hold their land as “trustee for the 
public.”52  
In Burchill, the City of Vancouver argued that an unlicensed driver was a 
trespasser and, as such, the City owed Burchill “no other duty other than not to do or 
to cause him malicious or wilful injury.”53 Burchill was a pre-Charter case but it 
shows that the common law has long recognised that members of the public have the 
right to “pass and repass” on a municipality’s streets.54 The Court accepted that 
Vancouver could regulate how their highways were used and punish those who failed 
                                                 
47
 Ibid at paras 200, 216; Adams (BCCA), supra  note 1 at para 129. 
48
 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the traditional use of government property 
will affect how it  can be managed, see Commonwealth of Canada, supra  note 11 at paras 10, 
12, 208. See also Richard Moon, “Out of Place: Comment on Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada v Canada” (1992-1993) 38 McGill LJ 204 at 208. 
49
 Joseph William Singer, “Sovereignty and Property” (1991-1992) 86 Nw UL Rev 1 at 47 
[Singer, “Sovereignty”]. 
50
 [1932] SCR 620, [1932] 4 DLR 200 [Burchill cited to SCR]. 
51
 Ibid at para 22. 
52
 Ibid; Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 131. 
53
 Burchill, supra  note 50 at para 21. 
54
 Ibid at paras 17, 22. 
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to observe these rules, with the caveat that such laws could not criminalize accessing 
the property itself.55  Such a conclusion echoes the City of Victoria’s claim in Adams 
that they were not preventing the homeless from accessing and using public parks, 
they were merely regulating how the parks were used.  In both cases, the Cities 
claimed to restrict the use of their property with the aim of protecting the public. 56 
Arguably when Ross J spoke of public property being held for public benefit, 
she had in mind something similar to a trust; although, unlike Rinfret J, she does not 
state this explicitly.57 Understanding government owned property as being held in a 
trust for the public does not change the nature of the property being held.  Trust 
property remains private property, the difference that a trust makes is that the trustees 
hold the property for the benefit of others.58  As such in Canada, government owned 
property and privately owned property are not inherently different.  It should also be 
noted that the alleged trust under which government property is held does not 
actually exist; the trust concept is used as an analogy to limit what the government 
can do with its property.   
Other countries do, however, explicitly distinguish between privately owned 
property and government owned property.59 Christine Willmore identifies two other 
models of government ownership, in addition to the private property model.  She 
calls these models the public obligation model and the dualist model.60  Under the 
former, all property must serve the public interest thus “public obligations are an 
inherent part of the definition of property rather than a subsequently imposed 
limitation.”61 The dualist model sees property as being either public or private with 
the two categories being subject to different law.62 In France, property classed as 
domain public is seen as the property of all citizens.63 
                                                 
55
 Ibid at para 22. 
56
 Ibid; Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para 31; In Adams, the City argued that its by-laws 
were intended to protect public health. 
57
 Adams (BCSC), supra  note 2 at para131. 
58
 Samantha J Hepburn, Principles of Equity and Trusts 4th ed (Sydney: The Federation Press, 
2009) at 358-360. 
59
 Christine Willmore, “Constructing “Public Land”: The Role of “Publicly” Owned Land in 
the Delivery of Public Policy Objectives” (2005) 16:3 Stellenbosch L Rev 378 at 384-386. 
60
 Ibid at 384. 
61
 Ibid at 385. See e.g. Grundrechtskatalog 1949, art 14.2 , Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Grundrechskatalog), online: < https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf> [as cited in ibid at 385]. 
62
 Willmore, supra  note 59 at 385-386. Willmore uses the French and Italian systems as 
examples. 
63
 Ibid. See also Cons Constititutionnel, 25 June 1986, Privatisations, Rec 1986 61, 86-207 
DC, online: < http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-
decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/1986/86-207-dc/decision-n-86-207-dc-du-26-
juin-1986.8271.html> [as cited in ibid at 386]. 
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The trust analogy of government owned property did not disappear with the 
advent of the Charter.  In the Commonwealth of Canada case, Lamer CJC suggested 
that the government has a “quasi fiduciary duty” to the public with regard to its 
property when he said that the government owns property “for the citizens’ benefit 
and use.”64 
By the time the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth of Canada, it had the 
benefit of significant American jurisprudence dealing with the freedom of expression 
on government property and its solution of the ‘public forum’ doctrine.65 The 
Supreme Court decided against adopting the American ‘public forum’ doctrine. 
Instead the Court opted to defer to the government and its use of the property, over 
and above the Charter rights of citizens.66 
The judgments in Commonwealth of Canada  focus mainly on the issue of the 
freedom of expression; however, as the issue was accessing government property to 
communicate, the case does contain a commentary on public property relevant to 
Adams.  The government claimed in Commonwealth of Canada  that it had the same 
property rights as any other owner, but Lamer CJC, Sopinka, L’Heureux-Dube, 
Gonthier, and Cory JJ rejected this claim.67 Interestingly, McLachlin and LaForest JJ 
argued that the government could exclude people from its property subject only to the 
Charter. La Forest J went so far as to say “[a]s a general proposition, the Crown's 
proprietary rights are the same as those of a private owner, but in exercising them the 
Crown is subject to the overriding requirements of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.”68 McLachlin and La Forest JJ’s opinion on government owned 
property seems to be markedly different from Burchill. McLachlin and La Forest JJ’s 
view that government property only differs from private property due to the extra 
requirements that the Charter imposes seems to be an even stronger statement of the 
private property model than had previously existed.  
The Supreme Court may have rejected the American ‘public forum’ doctrine, 
but it did provide its own balancing act for government owned property in Canada.  
Richard Moon has described the balancing act as the Court attempting to differentiate 
between ‘private’ government property and ‘public’ government property.69 The 
Court had particular difficulties with its attempt to differentiate between these 
categories of government property. 
McLachlin J effectively introduces the idea of completely ‘private’ government 
owned property.70 In the context of Commonwealth of Canada , McLachlin J found 
that the right to free expression on government owned property was restricted to 
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government properties that were traditionally publicly accessible.71 However, she 
bases her test for the right of access on the state’s use of its property,72 which results 
in ignoring the availability of other forums for expression.73  The effect of McLachlin 
J’s balancing act in Commonwealth of Canada  is to ultimately defer to the 
government as a property owner to decide on how to control its property.74  However, 
McLachlin J’s attempt to introduce a public/private divide into government owned 
property points to an understanding that the categorization of property is complex. 
In her judgment, L’Heureux-Dube J shares the view that not all government 
property was available to the public under freedom of expression, and she too 
attempted a public/private division.75  Unlike McLachlin J, L’Heureux-Dube J’s 
differentiation between public and private government owned property results in 
different standards of review rather than the automatic failure of free expression on 
‘private’ government owned property.76  
Reading the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada together, it is clear that 
the Court was attempting to defer to the state’s use of its property rather than the 
nature of the right infringed.77  The Court declared that the government had the same 
rights as a private owner except for the Charter.  Yet in their attempt to explain how 
the Charter limitation might operate, the Court revealed that it was the use, and not 
the owner of the property, that made government property either public or private. 
The use distinction has echoes of the French model of state property, which is 
divided into domain public or domain privé.  The former type of ownership is only 
open to public bodies and has certain restrictions; for example, it must be declassified 
by the Conseil d’Etat before the state disposes of it.  The latter type of ownership, 
however, gives the state all the same rights as a private owner.78   
In addition, it is possible that the use distinction could be extended to property 
that is owned by private individuals.  L’Heureux-Dube J, in her judgment in 
Commonwealth of Canada, referred to American jurisprudence which subjects some 
publicly accessible private property to constitutional rights such as freedom of 
expression.79  L’Heureux-Dube J is quick to note that current Canadian jurisprudence 
has not yet adopted the American position, and the position in Canada remains that of 
Harrison, which allows a private owner to exclude anyone from their property.  
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However, L’Heureux-Dube J quotes from the majority decision and Laskin CJC’s 
dissent noting that Harrison was decided pre-Charter.80  This suggests that Harrison 
may now be out of date.81   
In Harrison, Dickson J stated that the law in Canada “has traditionally 
recognized...the right of the individual to the enjoyment of property and the right not 
to be deprived thereof, or any interest therein, save by due process of law.”82 Dickson 
J pointed out that the shopping centre owner in Harrison “had never permitted the 
distribution of pamphlets or leaflets, or the carrying of placards, within the mall.”83 In 
other words, Dickson J found that the shopping centre’s exclusion of striking workers 
was a part of a longer standing regime of property control. 
Should a case with similar facts come before the Supreme Court again, 
L’Heureux-Dube J’s discussion of Harrison in Commonwealth of Canada suggests 
that the outcome might be different.84 She quotes from the portion of Laskin CJC’s 
dissent which argued that the majority’s finding in Harrison did not accurately reflect 
“economic or social fact.”85  Laskin CJC argued that where private property, such as 
a shopping centre, was open to the public, the property’s owner has invested the 
public with a right of access, subject to each individual’s lawful behaviour.86  Laskin 
CJC did not, however, make the right of access to such private property absolute but 
limited it to the hours of business only.87 
In his dissent, Laskin CJC referred to American jurisprudence and its granting of 
an unrestricted right of access to shopping centres because of their similarity to the 
public markets of old.88 Despite Laskin CJC’s reference to the American solution, no 
American court “acknowledged a general right of access to property open to the 
public” until the New Jersey Supreme Court did in 1982.89  
Laskin CJC did not adopt the same solution as the American courts.  Despite 
disagreeing with the majority’s remedy, Laskin CJC also rooted his solution in the 
private property model and its right to exclude. He proposed that the correct approach 
was to recognize a “continuing privilege” to use the publicly accessible areas of 
private property so long as the public behaved lawfully.90  Laskin CJC’s solution is 
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that when private properties, such as shopping centres, are open to the public the 
owner cannot exclude members of the public arbitrarily, but the private property 
owners can regulate when their properties are open to the public.  Thus the private, 
publicly accessible properties in question would only become subject to the rights of 
access that exist on government owned publicly accessible properties. These private 
property owners retain ultimate control of access to their property, in keeping with 
the private property model. 
Two lower court decisions, Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited v Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union91 and Queen’s University at Kingston v 
C.U.P.E., Local 22992 distinguished Harrison, but did not explicitly say that 
Harrison was out of date.  In Cadillac Fairview, the Court said that Harrison “cannot 
be read so as to give shopping centre owners the unfettered right to control the use of 
their premises without regard to the provisions of the Labour Relations Act.”93 
Whereas in Queen’s University, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that there “was no 
unrestricted invitation to the public to enter”, and thus the University was not 
publicly accessible.94   
Litman concluded that Harrison was wrongly decided and that it will eventually 
be reconsidered and reversed 95; but as yet, no lower court has explicitly refused to 
follow it, though it has been repeatedly distinguished.  It is not certain that the 
Supreme Court would grant access to the property of a private owner for the purposes 
of free speech. In Commonwealth of Canada , McLachlin J commented that the 
Charter does not “extend to private actions...therefore...confers no right to use private 
property as a forum for expression.”96  However, it is not always clear where to draw 
the public/private line when it comes to the applicability of the Charter.97  
While the Charter has changed how the Supreme Court treats property, it has 
not made government owned property into a separate category.  The assumption 
remains that all property is essentially private; and consequently only property 
owners, regardless of who they are, have property rights.  Despite the dominance of 
the private property model, Canadian courts have previously diluted private property 
rights on the grounds of public policy.98 
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The Supreme Court’s reliance on the private property model implies that there 
are no other ways of thinking about property.  Such an implication is untrue. 
European countries have a long history of recognizing public property as a separate 
category ab initio.99  Regardless, the existence of public property as a separate 
category may not leave room for the homeless any more than the private property 
model does.  However desirable separate categories of public and private property 
may be, the distinction between the two is not always clear cut and may not 
accurately reflect the modern complexity of property. I will argue that the private 
property model in the common law has been too narrowly interpreted and perhaps 
there is room for the homeless after all. 
 
FINDING ROOM FOR THE HOMELESS 
 
Joseph Singer has pointed out that the common law has long recognised that 
certain types of private property could not arbitrarily exclude people.  In particular, 
privately owned properties, such as inns, that held themselves out as being open to 
the public had a duty to serve the public under the law of public accommodation.100 
Singer has pointed out the assumption that property, like shops and shopping centres, 
cannot exclude individuals arbitrarily, giving these private property owners certain 
obligations usually held exclusively by governments.101 Singer has suggested an 
alternative model of property, called the social relations model, which seems to better 
reflect how property operates.  The social relations model calls for a broader 
understanding of the private property model and emphasizes that the common law 
can recognise ideas such as common ownership and individuals’ property interests 
extending beyond the boundaries of their own property, overlapping with that of their 
neighbours and community.  On its own, the social relations model may not go far 
enough. Moreover, the model does not explicitly comment on the effect it would 
have on government owned public property.  This section will first explore the social 
relations model before moving on to explore the trust analogy of government owned 
property, and will then combine ideas from the two models to show how the private 
property model has room for the homeless. 
 
THE SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL OF PROPERTY 
Nicholas Blomley’s work on Vancouver points to the idea that even private 
homes might have certain public aspects. Blomley surveyed the inhabitants of a 
neighbourhood in Vancouver to see if they thought there was a difference between 
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their front and rear gardens, the point being that the front gardens were more publicly 
visible.102 Vancouver and other cities have by-laws which require owners to maintain 
their property in ways that suggest an underlying public interest.103 Such by-laws 
directly infringe on the private property model’s idea of the owner having the right to 
control his or her property however they see fit. The public interest in these by-laws 
is frequently framed as economic.  For example, the value of your property might be 
adversely impacted if your neighbour has an unkept garden. 
An argument in defence of the rights that the private property model provides is 
that property serves a significant economic function.  For example, private property is 
thought to encourage people to develop their property and make it fruitful.104  Thus, 
the by-laws which force people to maintain their property are actually in keeping 
with the dominant private property model, because they protect the economic 
investment of private property.  While such by-laws support the idea that property 
has significant economic functions, the by-laws also reveal that private property is 
dependent on others and is inherently relational and social.  Even the private property 
model functions as a social system105 and is not just a way to protect individual’s 
rights. 
Singer’s proposed social relations model of property actually allows for several 
models of property to exist in the various spheres of social life.106 The social relations 
model is rooted in the common law understanding of property but rather than 
emphasizing the private aspects of property and the right to exclude,107 it focuses on 
the balancing of rights and interests to property.  Singer goes on to list several models 
of property and ownership that already exist or are recognised under the common law 
to illustrate that the private property model is a gross oversimplification that may not 
be helpful in understanding property.108 
The social relations model is particularly convincing in two places: first is when 
Singer uses the existing doctrine of nuisance to argue that property rights are all 
about balancing the owner’s right to his or her property with the effect this will have 
on other people.109  Singer proposes that nuisance should be the basis of a new model 
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of property rights.  However, this also results in a property model that requires 
judicial balancing in order to allow homeless people to use public property in a way 
that affords them life, liberty and security of the person.  More importantly, there is 
no guarantee that a property model based on nuisance would include the homeless as 
members of the community whose interests were being balanced.  Thus, the nuisance 
model may also exclude the homeless.   
The second aspect of the social relations model which is most convincing is the 
recognition of multiple owners and overlapping interests in property. The examples 
that Singer gives are marital property, joint ownership, tenancy, business 
partnerships, and corporations to name but a few.110 Arguably, a community interest 
would be classed as an acceptable property interest under the social relations model, 
but it could also be available under the common law. 
Recognising that communities have an interest in the property within their area 
is a broader understanding of the doctrine of nuisance. An example of how a 
community interest in property might work is provided by Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside (“DTES”). When a developer acquired permission to turn a derelict building 
in the DTES into condos, the residents of the area objected, and claimed the building 
as community property.111 The DTES residents feared that if the Woodward’s 
building was transformed into condos, it would be the first step in removing the poor 
from the area.  The residents of the area squatted in and around the building, and 
eventually the developers and Vancouver agreed to develop Woodward’s in 
consultation with the DTES residents.112   
Blomley argues that the Woodward’s example challenges the traditional 
understandings of property.  He points out that tenants in the single room occupancy 
(“SRO”) hotels which surround Woodward’s, are in a precarious position in that their 
property rights are sub-ordinate, in the eyes of the law, to the property rights of their 
landlords.113  It is hard to see how the private property rights that tenants have can be 
“a bulwark of individual liberty and autonomy” as they are wholly contingent on 
their landlords continuing to run the hotels as hotels.114  The hotel landlords’ property 
rights are currently granted more legal protection, but this protection can be used to 
expropriate the property of others.115 Unless we recognise that the tenants’ and the 
landlords’ property rights ought to be protected, the protection of private property 
rights will continue to operate to harm more vulnerable parties. 
If the protection of private property rights can actually make some property 
rights more vulnerable (i.e. tenants’ rights are more precarious than landlords’ rights), 
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it is clear that those who lack any private property rights or interests are even more 
vulnerable.  The tenants of the hotels in Vancouver’s DTES currently have no legal 
redress should their landlord opt to convert the hotel into condos or alter the terms of 
the tenancy which make it impossible for long-term residents to stay.116  By valuing 
the landlord’s right to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit over and above 
the rights of his tenants, the current understanding of property law leaves the 
economically disadvantaged subject to the constant risk of displacement.117 
The homeless who were ‘camping’ in Victoria’s public parks are perhaps even 
more vulnerable than the tenants of SRO hotels.  Blomley and Singer have both 
argued that non-owners have an interest in property which is worthy of legal 
protection,118 but a homeless person has no right of their own because their status of 
‘no property’ is not recognised by law.  While the residents of the DTES could make 
claims about community property, their underlying fear was that the development of 
Woodward’s would threaten their own precarious property rights.119  As a 
consequence, the homeless were arguably left out of this idea of community.  The 
homeless who live in the DTES only have a community interest in the area because 
they have no private property. However, the assertion of Woodward’s as community 
property was motivated by a desire to protect the private property interests of the 
residents of the DTES which meant that without a private property interest, the 
homeless were also excluded from the community property. 
Jeremy Waldron has pointed out that community and property are intertwined 
and, as such, community can be just as exclusionary as property.120 There is a way, 
however, to think about property so as to leave room for the homeless. Singer and 
other commentators have pointed out that property acts as a social system.121 
Currently, property operates in Canada to deny those without private property a right 
to exist.  Translated into a social system, the current Canadian understanding of 
property renders the homeless visible only by their invisibility.  Homeless people’s 
invisibility results from the laws and by-laws that impose obligations impossible for 
those without private property to uphold.122 Laws which impose impossible 
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obligations are considered null and void;123 thus in order for these public behaviour 
laws and by-laws to be valid, the homeless must not exist. 
Homeless people, however, do exist in spite of the laws that try to make their 
public life difficult, if not impossible.124  Attempts to regulate public property, 
especially government owned publicly accessible property, in a way that denies the 
existence of people who need to live entirely in public will fail. The by-laws at issue 
in Adams did not prohibit sleeping in parks, but they did regulate the way that people 
could sleep in parks so as to make it impossible for a person to sleep in a park and 
stay healthy.125 While the BC Supreme Court recognised that “[t]he use of some 
public property by the homeless is unavoidable”126, the Court still seems to think that 
the homeless will only need temporary access to the parks.  Presumably they will 
have to move somewhere else during the day if they are not to run afoul of the by-
laws. 
It may not always be possible for the homeless to move somewhere else during 
the day, or move quickly enough to comply with the “temporary overnight shelter” 
limit that the Court of Appeal introduced into Victoria’s by-laws.127 For example, a 
homeless person may not be well and need to rest during the day, yet Victoria’s by-
laws only allow the homeless to shelter themselves at night.    
The homeless cannot fulfil the temporary aspect which is implicit in the rights of 
access to publicly accessible property.  Currently the legal protections that the 
homeless have seem to stem from an inadequate understanding of their plight.  The 
homeless are forced to fight for the right to live, as participation in society remains 
beyond them.  Perhaps if, as Baron suggests, ‘no property’ was a recognised legal 
category, the regulation of the homeless could be made less problematic.128 
Baron has only hinted at what a developed concept of ‘no property’ might look 
like.  She has suggested that it is the “photographic negative” of the wealth and rights 
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that private property provides,129 and that it is a position of “social and legal 
vulnerability”130, but she has not discussed how it might operate or even if the 
common law has room for it.  Perhaps if Baron’s ideas are combined with 
Macpherson’s concept of the “right not to be excluded” and the trust analogy of 
public property, we can find room for the homeless in the common law. 
 
THE TRUST ANALOGY 
As shown above, the problem with the social relations model proposed by 
Singer is that it may not allow any more room for the homeless than the current 
model of property. Singer’s model does not currently articulate how those who have 
no private property rights would be able to survive. However, Singer reminds us that 
private property rights are elastic enough to conceive of multiple persons with 
interests in and rights to one piece of property. The understanding of property rights 
in Canada is elastic enough to recognise categories of property that are not strictly 
private property. 
The decision in Commonwealth of Canada  hints that government owned 
property might be different from privately owned property, but the Supreme Court 
seemed unable to break completely from the private property model. Macpherson 
argued that the concept of property could not logically be restricted to private 
property and that the understanding of property as being only private property was 
the result of certain historical circumstances.131 He argued that there were three 
categories of property: private property, common property, and state property.  
According to Macpherson, what distinguishes common property is that individuals 
have a right not to be excluded from it, whereas private property gives individuals the 
right to exclude others.132 
It seems that when Baron talks about ‘no property’ she really means ‘no private 
property.’  Her failure to distinguish ‘property’ from ‘private property’ is symbolic of 
just how dominant the private property model has become.  Therefore, if we are to 
reclaim Macpherson’s concept of common property and the rights that individuals 
have in such property, it is necessary to find a private property analogy to common 
property:this analogy is the implied trust.  The trust analogy would appear to be the 
common law’s way around the lack of a distinctive concept of public property.   
Thus, the trust analogy could also be used to implement Macpherson’s category of 
common property. 
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The trust analogy, that Rinfret J described in Burchill and that Ross J hinted at in 
Adams, was invoked to limit what governments can do with their property.133  Ross J 
stated that publicly owned property was held for public benefit134, but she did not 
elaborate on the rights of the public as beneficiaries of this implied trust.  The rights 
that an individual citizen has to publicly owned (and publicly accessible) property 
does not include the right to exclude others as that would defeat the purpose of such 
public property.  Therefore the right that an individual citizen has to public property 
must be the right not to be excluded.  Macpherson’s concept of common property is 
in many ways similar to the trust analogy used by Rinfret and Ross JJ, for 
Macpherson argues that, “[t]he “state creates the rights, the individuals have the 
rights.  Common property is created by the guarantee to each individual that he will 
not be excluded from the use or benefit of something.”135  
Macpherson argues that common property is “the most unadulterated kind of 
property [because it]...is always the right of the natural individual person.”136 It must 
also be the property right that an individual is left with when he is reduced to Baron’s 
‘no (private) property’ classification. There is some irony then, that when an 
individual has no private property rights and thus is most in need of his share of the 
public benefit of public property, he is most likely to find public property closed to 
him through regulations which criminalize his lack of private property. Under 
Macpherson’s understanding of the rights that individuals have to common property, 
homeless individuals are left open to the accusation that their use of common 
property is excluding others from using it.  Macpherson recognised that the 
government could regulate common property in a way that would limit the rights of 
individuals to it,137 but pointed out that all forms of property and rights in and to 
property were ultimately justified through reference to “the individual right to life”138  
This justification is a clear echo of the homeless people’s arguments that the City of 
Victoria’s by-laws infringed their right to life. It does not necessarily solve the 
problem that upholding homeless people’s right not to be excluded from common 
property results in the infringement of other citizens’ rights not to be excluded. 
 
SOCIAL RELATIONS AND COMMON PROPERTY 
This paper critiqued Singer’s social relations model, because Singer’ model does 
not allow for any property rights other than private property rights and thus it leaves 
no room for the homeless.  The trust analogy that Canadian courts use to describe and 
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limit government-owned public property is similar, if not identical, to Macpherson’s 
concept of common property. However, Macpherson’s concept of “the right not to be 
excluded” would still leave the homeless vulnerable to the accusation that through 
their permanent existence on public property, they infringe other citizens’ right not to 
be excluded. 
Singer’s social relations model calls for the balancing of rights and interests to 
property rather than focusing on the exclusionary aspects of the right to property. If 
we understand Singer’s model as emphasising, or at least recognising, the social 
obligations of property rights and combine it with the trust analogy or Macpherson’s 
concept of common property then the right not to be excluded emerges as a right 
which grants substantive equality, not formal equality. As Cohen put it, 
“property...cannot be pursued absolutely without detriment to human life.”139 
Canadian courts have limited government regulation of public property when it 
infringes on a person’s right to life;the right not to be excluded must also be limited 
by the right to life. The balancing described by the ‘social trust’ model of property 
should take place at the policy level as well as at the judicial level. It is vital that 
policy makers undertake such balancing, as homeless individuals frequently lack the 
resources to challenge laws and policies that restrict their ability to keep themselves 
alive. 
Property theorists have long grappled with how to justify private property when 
such a system has the potential to leave no room for those without any rights to 
private property. John Locke and William Blackstone grudgingly allowed room in 
their theories of property for those with no private property. Locke qualified his right 
to private property by saying it was acceptable “at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others.”140 Blackstone granted the poor the right to collect 
the crop remnants left in the fields after a harvest and thought that the destitute had 
some right to assistance from those who were more prosperous.141 
Locke and Blackstone tried to construct an understanding of property that would 
leave room, however small, for those with no private property of their own. Carol 
Rose has argued that the uneven distribution of property made Blackstone 
uncomfortable because property claims are interdependent on other people accepting 
such claims.  Rose’s argument contradicts the idea that private property protects an 
individual’s independence.142  The homeless are in many ways deeply threatening to 
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the justifications offered for private property and the way it regulates space and 
society.143 
The City of Victoria’s by-laws attempted to make the homeless less visible, for a 
person sleeping uncovered in a park is not always immediately noticeable.  People 
are much more visible when they have built a temporary shelter to sleep under. The 
Court of Appeal’s amendments to the by-laws, which make “temporary overnight 
shelter” acceptable,144 do not make the homeless any more visible, as public parks are 
not typically used by the public at night. The Court’s decision was in keeping with 
the idea that everyone only needs temporary access to publicly accessible property.   
However, if we understand such publicly accessible property as common 
property, as conceived of by Macpherson, then we can see that the Court’s decision 
in Adams still reflects a private property only model. The decision in Adams does not 
properly balance the rights and interests of the public in the property which the 
government hold in trust for them. The Court attempts to keep the right of access to 
common property as formally equal as possible. A proper balancing of the rights and 
interests of the public in such property would have recognised that the homeless had 
nowhere else, where they could legally be on a permanent basis. Under a ‘social 
trust’ model of property, the Court would have had to recognise that the homeless 
have no private property rights and thus their need for the “public benefit” of public 
property is greater than those who have private property rights. 
The decision also implicitly assumes that there is a clear division between public 
and private property, when there is not. Given that the Supreme Court of Canada has 
not yet recognised that owners, who grant the public access to their property, may 
have limited some of their rights to exclude arbitrarily, and may have acquired some 
of the obligations imposed on the government, the homeless are effectively restricted 
to publicly accessible government owned property.  The City of Victoria argued, and 
the Court of Appeal agreed, that it had a duty to regulate its parks so that they were 
protected and maintained for everyone to use.  Nevertheless, the homeless were not 
included in that category, because their use was and is necessarily different from that 
of everyone else. Recognising that different people use parks in different ways does 
not grant anyone a private property right to such public property, it merely ensures 
that their right not to be excluded from the benefit of the ‘social trust’ of government 
property is taken seriously and protected. 
The homeless are often described as having only duties and obligations when it 
comes to public property, with no rights of their own.  While the description of the 
homeless lacking rights to privately owned property is correct, it ignores the duties 
and obligations of those who have private property rights, and that the homeless may 
have rights in other forms of property, such as government owned property.  
Although property owners’ rights and obligations are usually framed in relation to 
other property owners, the common law does have room to allow for obligations 
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towards the community as a whole, including those who are homeless.  Given the 
strength of the private property model in Canadian jurisprudence, it is unlikely that 
the obligations owed to the community would be imposed in their entirety on private 
owners, thus they must be imposed on government owned property, at least insofar as 
it is in accordance with the government’s use of its property.145 
The homeless have to use publicly accessible government owned property for so 
long as they are without private property of their own.  Thus, regulations which make 
publicly accessible property more attractive to other citizens by denying the existence 
of the homeless are unacceptable and unworkable.  Such regulations effectively deny 
that the homeless are members of the public entitled to the benefit of government 
owned property.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Regulating public property, such as parks, to take account of the different uses 
people will make of the property is complex. However, the homeless are part of the 
community too,146 even if this fact is often overlooked. As the homeless are part of 
the community and members of the public, they have the right to access and use 
parks and similar property, but such rights are not and never have been construed as 
private property rights because they cannot exclude others from such property. 
Currently the homeless exist in a precarious state, that of ‘no property.’  They 
have nowhere else that they can legally be, aside from publicly accessible 
government owned property.  If the property that the homeless can legally access is 
regulated in a way that effectively bars them from that property, it merely removes 
the problem of homelessness to another area, or forces the homeless to constantly 
break the law.   
The common law understanding of private property has long placed obligations 
on owners to take account of others in the uses that they make of their property. 
These obligations also include duties towards the less fortunate. Today, property 
owners are typically concerned with protecting and increasing the value of their 
property. The presence of homeless people in a neighbourhood can decrease the 
value of the property in the area; therefore, cities and towns regulate their property in 
ways which make it impossible for the homeless to live legally. 
These anti-homeless regulations have the effect of excluding homeless people 
from both property and community. The Court of Appeal in Adams held that the City 
could not regulate its parks in such a way that would violate section 7 of the Charter. 
Yet apart from the limitations placed on the City of Victoria by the Charter, the City 
was entitled to regulate its property in the same way as a private citizen. The Court of 
Appeal seems to overlook the trust analogy that Ross J hinted at, which would have 
placed a further restriction on how Victoria could regulate its parks. The trust analogy 
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implicitly echoes Macpherson’s concept of common property, and if we combine 
these ideas with the balancing that Singer’s social relations model requires, the public 
benefit of the parks is not limited to those who only need temporary access to them. 
Therefore, while cities and towns can and must regulate their publicly accessible 
property in such a way that it is preserved for everyone, they cannot ignore their 
obligations towards the homeless. Cities and towns must not regulate their property 
in such a way that it makes it impossible for the homeless to live within their borders. 
 
 
 
